Summary:

In this article, Robert J. Art presents:
1) the change in efficacy of military power as an instrument of Usa foreign policy, ii) the four uses of force (defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering)
3) the impact of Nuclear weapons (reduce the utility of defense, ruled out physical nuclear compellence (though peaceful compellence remains unclear) and enhanced nuclear swaggering), and finally
4) argue military power will retain its role as a event of anarchy and a self-help system

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Function of force in US foreign policy

  1. three phases:
    1. Before Korean War
      1. Post WW2
      2. Prime tools of policies were: economic assist & political commitment > military ability (assistance and deterrent; indirect)
    2. Afterwards Korean War
      1. North korea assault
      2. Fear of direct assail
      3. Containment Policy
      4. Militarize foreign policy = large defense force budgets, proliferation of brotherhood and other war machine commitments, and war machine interventions
    3. Afterward Vietnam State of war
      1. 1960s: Nixon Doctrine (shrink its office in international affairs)
      2. Domestic revulsion to the apply of force
      3. 1972 SALT I Accord – end of nuclear superiority

Four Uses of Strength

(a framework to infer motive based on likely rationale by classifying the objectives of use of force/action)

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Impact of Nuclear Weapons

  1. States notwithstanding need military ability despite nuclear weapons
    1. Anarchy & cocky-help nature of international relations = military power still integral to foreign policy
  2. Nuclear power has altered the use of military powers:
    1. Downgraded function of defense
      1. Mutually Assured Devastation
      2. States want to prevent war
      3. Nuclear weapons have never been tested for defensive value
    2. Ruled out concrete nuclear compellence
      1. Except Japan in 1945
      2. Fear of escalation and loss of control + preserving the conventionalities that nuclear weapons are far more than dangerous than conventional weapons + preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (possession of power)
    3. Enhanced deterrence and nuclear swaggering
      1. Swagger appeal – prestige weapon; affects perception/ raises its importance and advent of security
      2. Aspiration and pretension fuels the demand to get nuclear
      3. Used primarily to deter attacks, secondarily for swaggering
    4. Unclear about utility of peaceful nuclear compellence (not implying that nuclear doesn't have political utility as shown below)
      1. difficult to ascertain the cause of peace (cause or effect)
      2. Superpowers cannot beget the risk of compellence, and cannot afford to back down/abroad from issuing/receiving a threat
      3. Fiddling utility for for overt compellence
  3. Three Caveats
    1. non all alter is resulted by nuclear weapons
    2. non all reactions are uniform
    3. non-nuclear forces still retains utility/role/purpose; not replaced by nuclear forces (unlike purpose & capability)

Not Nuclearly muscle leap

  1. Capability to deter attacks is notwithstanding important; not rendered impotent by threat of nuclear
    1. Security is a decisive reward
    2. Nuclear weapons are cheap, and then coin can be spent on other conventional forces
    3. Diplomatic gains from nuclear (wider margin of safety for diplomatic maneuvering/error, trade nuclear protection for other advantages, and freeing up resources due to inexpensive nuclear force)
  2. Two restrains on physical and political uses of nuclear (peaceful compellence)
    1. Intent of superpowers to avoid peaceful compellence
    2. America'southward strategic nuclear ability checked by Russian federation's strategic nuclear power
      1. Waning nuclear position: Monopoly-> superiority-> first strike-> well-nigh equal
      2. Relative equal
  3. Utility: Nuclear weapons not plenty
    1. Nuclear grants for independence – less reliant on alliances and prevent general war between superpowers (deterrence), withal it is
    2. Limited in its capability
    3. Not a substitute for political back up from inhabitants and political leadership
    4. Military power still necessary for political and economical success in international relations
    5. Better to be militarily strong than weak

Future of Force

Armed services ability notwithstanding cardinal to international relations

  1. Due to chaos
  2. Force remain final arbiter
  3. Though most disputes won't escalate to a hot conflict, armed forces power affects the peacetime dealing

Criticisms, and replies:

  1. Given nuclear threat, wars are unthinkable
    1. Fine art: You are disruptive cause and effect
  2. Common problem will unite mankind – common problems means that in that location will exist more cooperation
    1. Art: Reality shows that states face different problems, and even if they take common problems, they have different and conflicting solutions/don't always agree
  3. Economic interdependence – role of military power is devalued
    1. Fine art: Power structures the way states interact, and is a factor to how states choose to trade/bandwagon; ability creates political and economic preconditions to economic interactions (e.k. Collapse of Bretton Wood System and US ambivalence)
  4. Economic interdependence – US cannot use power against 3rd globe nations – need their resources
    1. Art:
      1. efficacy ≠ will to apply
      2. Admittedly, at that place are inherent limits of war machine ability to achieve economic objectives; military might can only give a bargaining edge. Ultimately, land'due south perception of economic interest determines the willingness of compromise and strike a bargain. Military power gives economic leverage
      3. U.s. economic power declined since 1970s – cannot be compensated by military power
      4. Force cannot be efficiently used to achieve goals when ambivalence be over goals – domestic interests conflicts with will to exercise strength (Hobson'south pick)